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Korea United: 
North & South Set Aside Differences to Demine 
Following a historic summit between Leaders from North and South Korea, ef-
forts are underway to clear a path through the DMZ. In the South, efforts are 
also being made to clear the paths civilians use in areas outside the DMZ. 
By Keith Feigenbaum,MA/C 
I n a land marred by over a half-century's wonh of fierce political divisions and lingering suspicions, 
agreemem and coexistence have come 
to be as rare as the landmines are 
plentiful. Such is the troubled state of 
Korea-from the isolationist Commu-
nist North, through the neutral (and 
heavily mined) demilitarized zone 
(DMZ), to the revitalized republic in 
the south. Despite the troubled history 
of this divided peninsula, steps have 
been taken recently to pur aside 
ideological differences and focus on 
the estimated 1.12 million mines in 
the 4 km-wide DMZ, as well as the 
tens of thousands of mines in "rear 
areas" situated outside the DMZ. 
In June 2000, leaders from North 
and South Korea met in a historic 
summit in Pyongyang. The meeting 
between South Korean President Kim 
Dae-jung and North Korea's Kim 
Jong-illed to efforts to reconstruct the 
Kyongui (Seoul to Shinuija) railroad 
and to create a four-lane highway that 
would link the two countries. Based 
on the leaders' desire to create this link, 
• Equipped with a mine detonation device, a South Korean K-1 tank drives across a mine field during 
training to remove landmines. c/oAP 
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the two sides' militaries set out in 
September 2000 to address the unique 
mine situation. 
Efforts Underway 
Un like many mine-affected 
countries, the vast majority of mines 
found in the Koreas have had minimal 
affects on civilian populations. The 
Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(KCBL) estimates that at least 1,000 
civilians have fallen prey to mines 
washed from the DMZ in flooding. 
Conversely, Koreans have the DMZ 
to thank for its role as a buffer against 
the 95 percem of mines suspected to 
be in Korea. Of South Korea's 
estimated 1.2 million mines, only 
about 68,000 have been located 
outside the DMZ in rear areas. 
Rachel Srohl, a senior analyst for 
the Center for Defense Information, 
writes, "The landmine problems 
facing North and South Korea differ 
from those encounte red in other 
countries afflicted with large numbers 
of mines. For the most part, mines in 
Korea are concentrated in well-
designated 'fields' along the DMZ and 
surrounding areas and do not affect 
farming, industry or other segments 
of'normallife ... ' The enduring danger 
from landmines in Korea, once the 
known fields are removed, ought to 
be much less than in countries such as 
Cambodia and Vietnam." 
Of course, while the landmine 
situation may differ from that of other 
affected countries, threats such as 
unmapped mine fields, floods that 
-
carry mines out of mapped areas (and 
often outside the DMZ) and the 
unknown nature of the mine problem 
in North Korea add an a ir of 
uncertainty to the overall situation. 
Demining in Rear Areas 
While the DMZ is widely known 
to be a dangerous, mine-affected area, 
rhe effects of mines on other regions 
of the Koreas are less publicized. 
Meanwhile, the effects on areas outside 
the DMZ in North Korea are shielded 
from the outside world. But, in South 
Korea, landmines have been identified 
in areas frequented by civilians. The 
mines found in these areas, more so 
than those located in the DMZ, pose 
a definite threat to civilians as many 
have been displaced through flooding 
or are unmapped. 
A November 2000 edition of The 
Ko rea Herald reported that the 
environ mental group Green Korea 
United (GKU) identified large 
numbers oflandmines "planted in and 
around Seoul and other large cities, as 
well as national and provincial parks." 
GKU has noted 21 mine-affected areas 
in the following South Korean 
provinces and cities (number of mine-
affected areas in parentheses): Kyonggi 
and South Kyongsang (4), South 
Chungchong (3), Pusan and South 
Cholla (2), and Seoul, Taegu, Ulsan, 
Kangwon, North Kyonsang, and 
Norrh Cholla (1 each). 
GKU Secretary General Lim 
Sam-jin told the Herald, "In most of 
the mined places, mine warning signs 
are easily found near villages, meaning 
the safety of civilians is threatened." 
In response to these threats, the 
South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(]CS ) announced in February 2001 it 
would remove all mines in rear areas 
by 2006-th e same y ar South Korea 
and the United Stares plan to sign the 
Mine Ban Treaty, contingent on the 
development of acceptable mine 
alternatives. The JCS expects to begin 
chis effort by clearing about 6,000 
APLs (the only type of mine reported 
to be found in rear areas) from these 
locations: two former air defense bases 
on Mr. Chungni in Pusan and in 
Kumo-ri in Hadong County, South 
Kyongsang Province, Haeundae in 
Pusan, Mr. Kumdan in Songnam, 
Kyonggi and Kwangju. 
The J CS expects the upcoming 
demining efforts to puc a significant 
dent in the already reduced number 
of mines oucside the DMZ. 
In a Herald article from Dec. 23, 
2000, a South Korean Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) official said, "The army 
completed the removal of some 1,100 
AP mines planted on top of Mount 
Kumho [sic] this year, where Nike 
missile radar systems were located. We 
have cleared a total of 6 ,800 mines in 
seven spots [since 1996] to reduce the 
number of landmines planted in the 
rear areas to around 68,000." 
To aid the military in demining 
Korea's rear areas, GKU, KCBL and 
the Japan Campaign to Ban Land-
mines (JCBL) have also reportedly 
agreed to begin efforts to map mine 
fields. According to KC BL Coordina-
tor Cho Jai-kook, the efforts will 
include surveys of three mine-affected 
areas that pose a threat to the lives of 
civilians and soldiers: two of rhe 21 
locations identified by GKU as mine-
affected, U.S. Air Force bases 
surrounded by AP mines and "civilian 
passage restricted areas" located from 
3 km to 30 km south of the DMZ. 
Railroad-Highway Construction 
Route 
On September 18, a force of 
about 2,800 South Korean soldiers set 
our to rake on the difficult task of 
ridding the train and highway 
construction route of its estimated 
100,000 mines. Of the 2,800 officers, 
700 were dispatched from field 
engineer battalions to begin mine 
clearance work with a deadline of 
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December 2000 in place (since 
postponed to September 2001), an 
official from the South Korean 
Defense Ministry told the Herald. 
Meanwhile, the North Korean 
military was also reported to have 
begun clearance efforts on September 
4, removing trees and other obstacles. 
Adding complexity to the mine 
s ituation is th e fact th at of the 
estimated 100,000 mines in the 
construction route, only 3,000 are in 
confirmed areas. This, along with the 
short timeframe allotted for clearance 
efforts, caused demining to be 
suspended in mid-December. South 
Korean defense officials expect work 
to resume following the spring thaw 
in March 2001. Lt. Gen. Sun Young-
jai of the South Korean Army told the 
Herald on Sept. 19 , 2000: "Our 
schedule for the mine clearance is 
flexible as we are putting top priority 
on the safety of soldiers. We have 
prepared various safety equipment and 
methods for our soldiers." 
Demining the DMZ 
A variety of demining methods-
noted by a variety of sources-have 
been identified as potential clearance 
methods to be used in creating a path 
through the DMZ. The South Korean 
Defense Ministry told the Herald in 
August 2000 of its plans to initiate a 
six-stage clearance program (see box 
on next page for elements of this 
program). 
The equipment used by deminers 
was expected to consist of a mix of 
foreign and Korean tools and vehicles. 
"We have designed remote-controlled 
'armored buckers' with thick steel 
plates and bulletproof windows 
attached to heavy equipment such as 
excavators, bulldozers, cranes and 
water sprinklers to be used for mine 
removal," Lt. Gen. Sun said. "With 
these safety measures, soldiers will be 
able to do most of their work without 
setting foot on the ground, thereby 
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• So uth Korean 
soldie rs move to 
the next position 
after removing a 
mine field fence 
as an armored 
mine clearing 
vehicle pulls 
foward during 
operations. 
c/oAP 
Anticipated Mine Clearance Procedures: 
• Use of water sprinklers to uncover mines. 
• Insertion of 15-meter-long plastic pipes filled with dynam ite and 
detonators into suspected areas (for mines up to 10 em 
underground). 
• Use of excavators and bulldozers to remove plants and dig up earth 
(for mines 20 to 30 em underground). 
• Final inspections by soldiers to ensure the removal of all mines. 
grea tly enh anc ing th e safety of 
deminers." 
Another method reported to be 
under consideration by the South's 
Defense Ministry was a "scorched 
earth policy." This method would 
involve spraying fuel alo ng the South 
Ko rean portion of the DMZ berween 
the Imjin River and C hangdan in 
Munsan and then burning rhe fuel. 
More Help on the Way? 
Although mine clearance and 
mine identification efforts in both rear 
areas and the D MZ have thus far been 
limited to the mili tary and civic 
groups, in January rhe South's Sungdo 
Constructio n Co . crea ted the 
demining firm Specialist Demin ing 
Engineering (SDE) to aid rhe Koreas 
• 28. 
and other mine-affected nauons 111 
clearance efforts. The firm's vice 
president, Koo Ja-ho, recently said the 
SDE has formed a "technical assistance 
agreement" with the UK's Specialist 
Gurkha Services (SGS)-one of the 
wo rl d 's to p-10 m ine and UXO 
clearance companies. Koo expressed to 
the Herald a desire to aid the Korean 
govern ments' demini ng efforts, saying 
that private firms are at an advantage 
over mi li tar ies when it comes to 
insuring operations, gain ing funding, 
and secu ring the most advanced 
equ•pment. 
To date, no formal agreement 
between the private firm and the 
Korean governments has yet w be 
announced. H owever, JCS Bartle 
Coordination Division official Lee 
Kang-soo, head of mine affairs in the 
d ivision, recently told the Herald the 
continued on page 30 
Southeast Asia 
Air Combat Data 
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency's Tom Smith details the United State's 
efforts to create an informational and relational database for mine/UXO identi-
fication in Southeast Asia and its importance in targeting landmines. 
by Tom Smith, 
Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency, Office of Humanitarian 
Demining 
0 ne of the greatest challenges in the global effort to remove the deadly debris of war and 
conflic t is the collection of records 
kept by the combatants from either 
side in the conflict. In that regard, the 
United States has realized the 
importance of, and is making 
available, data from a variety of sources 
to assist with the survey and clearance 
work in Southeast Asia. 
Since 1994, the humanitarian 
dem ining offices in the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
and U.S. Paci fi c Command, in 
conj unctio n with the Federal 
Resou rces Corpo ration and MRJ 
Tech nology Solu t ions, have been 
developing an informational/relational 
database derived from the separate 
declassi fied rapes of allied air combat 
and combat support operational 
activities conducted during the war in 
Indochina. The output of chis analysis 
will provide nations in the region with 
accurate target and ordnance data so 
that host countries can set priorities 
for UXO clearance operations and 
assess the p robab il ity of UXO 
contamination in areas identified for 
economic development. 
These combat missions were 
conducted in Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam from 1965 to 1975. The 
original data system was developed by 
TBM in the early 1960s and captured 
daily air combat information on the 
Vietnam conflict in the National 
Combat Command Information 
Processing System (NIPS). The data 
(class ified Top Secret) was maintained 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in 1976 
declassified and delivered to the 
National Archives for safekeeping. 
Four major databases are being 
reviewed for information that will 
assist host nations in determining the 
scope and scale of air bombardment, 
helping to prioritize bomb and mine 
clearance operations: 
Files Accessed & Data Period 
Combat Activities File (CACTA) 
October 1965 - December 1970 
Southeast Asia Database (SEADAB) 
January 1970- June 1975 
Strategic Air Command's Combat 
Activities report (SACCOACT) 
June 1965 -August 1973 
Herbicide Data Files- (HERBS) 
July 1965 - February 1971 
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Other databases to be reviewed 
include the Combat Naval Gunfire 
Files, Mining Activity Files, and other 
files relating to friendly and opposing 
force base camp and artillery data. 
Data in the air combat files 
includes specific mission numbers, 
type and number of aircraft, location 
of target, latitude/longitude coordi-
nates, ordnance type, number of 
ordnance dropped, and additional 
information on downed aircraft. 
The goal of this combined effort 
is to provide host nation mine action 
offices with geospatial information 
(maps, digital, and other data) to 
support humanitarian demining 
surveys, setting priorities for demining 
operations, training, and assessment of 
the mine and UXO threat to economic 
development activities. The recovered 
data are being incorporated into 
geospatial databases for analysis by the 
host nation mine action centers using 
Geographical Informacion Systems 
(GIS). 
Information for Laos has been 
retrieved, inco rporated into a 
relational database, and installed at the 
headquarters of the Lao National 
Unexploded Ordnance Program 
(UXO LAO ) in the capital city of 
Vientiane. The air combat informa-
tion is displayed with vector or raster 
geospatial data and used to plan UXO 
clearance operations and to assess the 
probable impact ofUXO on economic 
development projects. 
Herbicide mission data has also 
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been incorporated into the GIS at 
UXO LAO. Herbicide mission data 
was obtained from the U.S. Armed 
Services Center for Research of Unit 
Records (CRUR) that is also the 
source for substantiation of veteran's 
claims of herbicide contact. Data 
includes the original HERBS tapes 
plus man-portable, truck, and 
helicopter missions that were con-
ducted during the conflict. 
The partnership between the 
DSCA and irs contractors is also in the 
process of developing a user-friendlier 
informational/ relational database and 
look-up tables to better assist the end 
user in planning for and prioritizing 
bomb clearance missions in specific 
areas of the country. A prototype 
internet-accessible version of the 
geospatial data is also in the develop-
mental phase and will make it easier 
for host nations to access the data 
without a major investment in infor-
mation technology equipment. 
Maintaining the work on chis 
Korea United 
continued from page 28 
South Koreans are considering 
cooperating with SDE in clearing the 
estimated 20,000 mines on Mr. 
Chungni. 
The End in Sight? 
project is essential for continuing 
assistance ro Laos and possible 
expansion to the Cambodian Mine 
Action Center (CMAC) and the newly 
established Vietnamese Centre for 
Treating Technology Bombs and 
Mines. The project will continue to 
support our government's engagement 
strategy in the region. 
In October 2000, a senior 
Vietnamese military delegation visited 
the United States to observe demining 
training activities and discuss ways in 
which the two countries could begin 
engagement by sharing information 
on demining issues. The delegation 
was extremely impressed with the 
bombing data retrieval project and, as 
a result, former President C linton 
offered to share the information with 
the Vietnamese government during his 
historic visit ro Vietnam in November 
2000. Efforts a re underway to 
coordinate the d evelopment and 
support of this initiative with the 
Government ofViernam. 
The use of this kind of data, and 
the integration with facilitating 
technologies, is unprecedented and is 
a clear demonstration of the value that 
technology can play in enhancing 
demining efforts, reducing costs, and 
building cooperative efforts between 
nations . The skills being learn ed 
through this process and the 
knowledge gained will most certainly 
be of value in other countries and 
other situations. This and other like 
initiatives will help ensure that the 
world will become mine safe sooner 
rather than later. • 
Contact Information 
Mr. Tom Smith 
DSCA (HA-D) 
1111 Jeff Davis Highway - Suite 402 
Arlington, VA 22202 
Tel: (703) 601-3657 
Fax: (703) 602-0075 
E-mail: tom.smirh@osd. pentagon. mil 
partially reversing in about one year 
what rook over 50 years of animosity 
to create. • 
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When the Korean soil thaws in 
early spring and the demining effort 
is continued, the Koreas will be en 
route to clearing a path not just 
through the DMZ, bur through years 
of silence and conflict. Though we 
may never know of advances in 
clearance operations and mine 
awareness on the northern side of the 
DMZ, the North's pledged 
cooperation with the South is a huge 
step towards reconnecting the once 
united peninsula. Even the People's 
Republic of China has pledged 
technical and personnel support to 
both Koreas' efforts, according the 
August 23, 2000 Yonhap News. It 
could be said that the mine situation 
in Korea pales in comparison to such 
places as Bosnia-Herzegovina or 
Afghanistan. Perhaps this is true from 
a numerical standpoint. Bur when one 
considers a country divided in two by 
a guarded, man-made boundary and 
by stark ideological differences, there 
are few, if any, situations ro rival that 
of the Koreas. If, in fact, the drive to 
clear a path for railroad and highway 
construction is successful in 
September 2001 , the joint efforts of 
enemies will be responsible for 
8 5-l, Soosong-dong, Chongro-ku, 
Seoul, Korea 
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Pakistan: The Landmine Problem in 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
After a decade of fighting, the effects of conflict beyond Pakistan's bor~er wi~h 
Afghanistan are seen everyday in border regions. With little governmen~ a1d a~all­
able, agendes like HSD are taking the initiative in the country's battle agamst mmes. 
by Faiz Muhammad Fayyaz, Executive Director, 
Human Survival & Development (HSD) 
T he ravages of the decade-long art_Ued conflict i.n Afghanistan between che Sov1ecs and ann-co mmunist forces were not co nfin ed to 
Afghanistan. Rather, irs ill effects spilled over to neighbor-
ing countries. One effected country of note was Pakistan, 
which was used as a base for war activities. Pakistan served 
as a home to arms depots and camps for training guerillas, 
and as a passageway for logistic supplies and other activi ties 
for the coordination of the war effort. In addition, throngs 
of refugees crossed the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in 
search of safe harbor, rendering the border weaker and 
weaker throughout the war. . 
One of the most detrimental effects of the Afghani 
war on Pakistan was the thousands oflandmines left behind 
in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). Soviet 
troops dropped mines and bombs in FATA border rowns 
in order to intimidate the local population and prevent 
any support of anti-com munist fo rces. Alchough the 
Afghan war broke out in December 1979, it wasn't until 
the early-1980s that the land mine problem surfaced in the 
FATA. Of the seven tribal Agencies of the FATA, Bajaur 
and Kurram were the most effected, counting an alarming 
number of casualties. 
Bajaur and Kurram have witnessed some of the worst 
casualries, which affected not just soldiers bur women and 
children, as well. An encire disabled population now 
exists-a change chat has effected the socioeconomic fabric 
of the area. While the FATA was socially underdeveloped 
previous to rhe war, it has regressed further as a result of 
mines. The region's inadequate health services must deal 
wi th a public heal th situation of tragic proportions. 
Agricultural land has been rendered un-productive. Once 
productive men responsible for earning livelihoods have 
not only been rendered unproductive, but have become 
liabilities. Children have been forced to perform hard labor 
and beg on rhe streets. 
Assessment 
In order to assess the depth of Pakistan's landmine 
problem, 1997 Nobel co-laureate Rae McG~ath, an 
authori ty on landmines, visited Human Survival and 
Development (HSD) in the summer of2000 at the behest 
of the Swis s Federation for Mine Clearance and Swiss 
• Shaima, 9, waits to have her prostheses adjusted at the 
ICRC workshop. c7o ICRetAdrian Brooks 
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